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QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
A. Whether or not the Courts interpret Title 78-12-12, 
Utah Code Annotated, (1953, as amended) in accordance with the 
wording of the statute or some other way. 
B. Is an agreement for other land signed by individuals 
from outside the chain of title coupled with possession only of 
the captioned land and without paying taxes for seven years 
sufficient for adverse possession. 
OFFICIAL AND UNOFFICIAL REPORTS OF OPINIONS 
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A. The case that probably brought this decision out of 
the Sixth District Court, with the Honorable Don V. Tibbs, 
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presiding, is the case of Lach v. Deseret Bank, (see Court of 
Appeals case, dated December 7, 1987, on which a rehearing was 
denied January 14, 1988. Tn the Lach case, the Court of Appeals 
reversed Judge Tibbs on the same questions. There was an Earnest 
Money Agreement made prior to the docketing of the judgment lien. 
Judge Tibbs granted summary judgment for the creditor based upon 
the judicial sale, and the Court of Appeals set aside the motion 
for summary judgment. The reversal was with a holding that from 
the date that the judgment lien was filed, the property had 
already been sold by virtue of a forceable transfer of rights to 
a creditor for value. Stating that there was an enforceable 
right of purchase by virtue of equitable conversion, it stated 
at the moment that the enforceable executory contract of sale was 
created and the purchaser, thereafter, is treated as owner of the 
land. That a judgment lien created thereafter would not prevail. 
In the Lach case, Judge Tibbs decided in favor of the judgment 
lien on the basis that title was still in the person of record as 
of the filing of the judgment lien. This was reversed by the 
Court of Appeals with the filing date of December 7, 1987. A 
rehearing on the matter was denied January 14, 1988. 
B. in the instant case of Garland v. Rigby, et al., 
after refusing both Plaintiffs' and Defendant Fleischmannfs 
motions for summary judgment, the matter came before Judge Tibbs 
on the 6th day of October, 1988, approximately one year or 
less after the reversal in the Lach case. Judge Tibbs followed 
the Lach case but went one further. He made the same ruling to 
an existing sale contract which described different land, on 
testimony that the parties who then owned no interest in the 
property being the subject matter of the action, agreed that 
that would be the property covered by the conditional sale 
contract. There was never an amendment to the conditional sale 
contract. The Defendant Fleischmann could not deny the state-
ment that an agreement was made by someone outside of the chain 
of title. The Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law of the 
Garland v. Rigby, et al. case are the subject matter of this 
action and are set forth in the Addendum hereto as is the 
Memorandum Decision of the Court of Appeals and their Order 
Denying the Petition for Rehearing. 
Reference is made to the decision of the Court of 
Appeals on a two-to-one basis of the panel that heard the item. 
It was the decision of the Court of Appeals that the matter was 
not to be published. However, as a decision, it comes under 
this classification of,it is either an official report or it 
is an unofficial report of an opinion issued by the Court of 
Appeals. 
C. The Court of Appeals of Utah in the case of Frandsen 
v. Holladay, 739 P.2d 1111, decided the other way in a contested 
matter in which they endorsed the judgment lien as against the 
deed. The basis is that the purchase was subsequent. This is 
not the same situation as when the deed was executed after the 
judgment lien was filed. At that time, it was deeded back to 
the judgment debtor. 
D
• Averett v. Utah County Drainage District No.1, 
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763 P.2d 428; the situation in this case does not take care of the 
lien question but does take care of the adverse use. It was a 
situation of a drainage ditch and other property that had been 
deeded for drainage ditch purposes many years before. The present 
land owner of adjacent land claimed adverse possession. It was 
held that public use of the ditch pertained to the land adjacent 
to it that had been deeded for this purpose and took it out of 
the adverse possession question. The implication of this decision 
by the Court of Appeals on the 26th day of October, 1988, is to 
the effect that the adverse possession statute must be strictly 
complied with. At the sametime, the panel of the Court of Appeals 
was holding in the instant case, that it does not have to be 
complied with. 
E. In Marchant v. Park City and the State of Utah, 
771 P.2d 677, it was decided by the Court of Appeals of Utah 
on March 13, 1989, that the statute of adverse possession had 
to be strictly compiled with which is identical with the case 
at bar, except for the decision. Certiorari was granted on this 
item by the Supreme Court of Utah on September 5, 1989. 
STATEMENT OF GROUNDS 
Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is as follows: 
A. The decision of the panel from the Court of Appeals 
is the 1st day of September, 1989; the same was filed on that 
date. 
B. The Order Denying the Petition for Rehearing was 
dated the 11th day of October, 1989, and was filed on that date. 
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C. Not applicable. 
D. There is a question of statutory interpretation and 
conflicting opinions out of the Court of Appeals. This falls 
under the provisions of Rule 43 (1), (2) and (3). 
This is a matter that was originally tried before the 
District Court of the Sixth Judicial District for Garfield County, 
Utah, and was in the area where the Supreme Court of Utah had 
appellate jurisdiction. The Notice of Appeal was originally filed 
with the Supreme Court of the State of Utah, pursuant to statute. 
The case was then assigned to the Utah Court of Appeals by the 
Supreme Court of Utah pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, Section 
78-2A-3 (2)(j). The processes of the Court of Appeals have been 
exhausted. 
CONTROLLING PROVISIONS OF STATUTES 
At this time the Supreme Court of Utah has jurisdiction 
under the provisions of Title 78-2-2 (a) and the following 
statutes. 
A. Title 78-12-7, Utah Code Annotated, (1953, as 
amended.) 
B. Title 78-12-12, Utah Code Annotated, (1953, as 
amended.) 
The statutes are cited in the Addendum and are included verbatim 
therein. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
It appears that there are two realms of time that 
should be initially set forth independent of each other. One 
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is the time element of the Plaintiffs Garland and the other is 
the time element of the Defendant Anna R. Fleischmann. 
In setting up the time elements of the Plaintiffs 
Garland, one must first go to page 4 of the transcript. The 
parties that actually took part in the trial were Garland and 
Anna R. Fleischmann. Although Floyd J. Rigby had filed an 
answer, he did not receive trial notice. Ray Hall had an 
attorney present although there was no evidence that a pleading 
had been filed and that there were motions for dismissal per-
taining to the cause of action that was dismissed after the 
trial. Rimaras, Inc. was not represented. The whole trial 
was based upon the adverse possession of Robert G. Garland and 
Mary Garland. It was so stated by counsel on page 4 of the 
transcript, at line 14, MITm asking the Court to quiet title 
to this pice of property against all of the Defendant.M In the 
next line or so, counsel indicates that all are in default except 
for Miss Fleischmann and Ray Hall. A statement was made by HallTs 
attorney that Hall claimed no interest in the property continu-
ing with the transcript, page 4, from line 17 to page 5, line 3. 
It must be remembered that there are two lots that are discussed 
in this transcript. Apparently, the Court of Appeals did not 
ascertain this information. Lot #126 in the area described is 
the item set forth on the Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to 
Purchase. The people who signed as sellers never owned this 
property. Lot #128, two lots away, is the subject matter of this 
action. The following recites the elements pertaining to these 
lots from PlaintiffTs testimony. Garlands1 first interest in the 
property appears to be the Purchase Agreement of Lot #126 with 
individuals known as Rigby and Hall. The Purchase Money Agreement 
in evidence is on Lot #126, exhibit #1, which is included in the 
Addendum hereto. Although Garlands claimed it to be Lot #128, it 
was Lot #126. The Purchase Agreement was dated the 31st day of 
October, 1980. (See transcript page 10, lines 1 to 17.) There 
was an attempt to change it to Lot #128, which was objected to 
under the statute of fraud. (See transcript page 11, line 6.) 
There appears to be several conversations between Hall and Rigby 
and the Plaintiff concerning changing of lots. There was never 
a document achieved until after the involvement of Miss 
Fleischmann. The document actually achieved was never delivered 
until after the trial. The agreement may have been enforceable 
as to Lot #126; it has never been enforceable as to Lot #128. 
Floyd J. Rigby and Ray Hall never owned the property. Garlands 
became aware of this when they tried to pay taxes in 1986. At 
that time, they thought they were dealing personally with Rigby 
and Hall. (See transcript page 15, lines 1 to 6.) 
Mr. Garland did not pay taxes on the property until 
1986 at which time he paid taxes for 1981, 1982, 1983, 1984, and 
1985. (See transcript, page 16, line 13, and exhibit 13.) The 
date of payment was January 31, 1986. (See transcript, page 16, 
line 30. Also see transcript page 17, lines 17 to 19 inclusive. 
Also see transcript page 18, lines 8 to 10 inclusive.) During 
this period, he took possession of the property and built on 
the property in the early 1980s. He paid the 1987 taxes. (See 
transcript page 28, line 9; page 29, line 3, and exhibit 5.) 
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Payment of the 1987 taxes were paid in November, 1987. Payment 
of these taxes and the testimony of Mrs. Henrie, the Garfield 
County Treasurer is quite material. (See transcript page 39, 
lines 4 to 13.) On page 40 of the transcript, line 1 shows that 
the five years —1982 through 1985 inclusive—taxes were paid by 
Mr. Garland in 1986. The rest of page 40 of the transcript shows 
that Mr. Garland paid the 1987 taxes. Exhibit 8 on page 41 of 
the transcript identifies a lady jn Nevada, Miss Fleischmann, 
as the person who paid the 1986 taxes prior to the trial. At 
the time of the trial, they were paid. 
The other essential time element is the title of Lot 
#128. This was established by a title person by the name of 
Thomas B. Hatch, (see transcript pages 33 to 39.) On page 33, 
at line 22 of the transcript, Lot #128 was identified as exhibits 
10 and 11. Exhibit 10 was an abstract; exhibit 11 was a copy of 
a deed. Mr. Rigby and Mr. Hall never owned any interest in the 
property during the time of the abstract. (See transcript, page 
35, lines 18 to 26.) At such time, the Court asked Mr. Hatch to 
run through the abstract. (See transcript, page 35, line 23.) 
The abstrat^ checked back to 1940, when a Mrs. Jensen owned the 
property. The property was then deeded to a Mr. and Mrs. Allen. 
When Mr. Allen died, a tax waiver from the Utah State Tax Commiss-
ion and an affidavit of survivorship were filed. (See transcript 
page 37, lines 1 to 8.) Mrs. Warwick, the remarried Mrs. Allen, 
deeded the property to Rimaras, Tnc. on the 14th of July, 1981. 
There was never any transfer of title whatsoever until the time 
of trial. (See transcript, page 37, lines 22 to 25.) There v/as no 
transfer of title until the Fleischmann judgment. (See transcript 
page 38, lines 14 and 15.) From this, it can be seen that the 
effective date of the filing of the Fleischmann judgment in Garfield 
County was the 8th day of July, 1985, at which time the property was 
in the name of Rimaras, Inc. Rimaras is not a party to any agree-
ment and no one in chain of title dealt with the Plaintiffs. The 
written agreement of Hall and Rigby was on Lot #126. There was 
nothing but verbal agreements between Hall and Rigby pertaining 
to Lot #128 and Rimaras was not a party to the same. The redemp-
tion time expired, and the SheriffTs deed was recorded after the 
suit was started but was recorded before trial. The question is, 
what was the interest of Rimaras, Inc. in Lot #128 on July 8, 
1985. This was the date of the judgment lien recording to Anna R. 
Fleischmann. The SheriffTs deed was delivered and recorded after 
the suit was started. The abstract was entered as exhibit 10 and 
was identified by Mr. Hatch. (See transcript, page 34, lines 14 
to 15. The same is dated July, 1988.) There is no reference to 
Hall or Rigby in the title whatsoever. Mr. Hatch in his testi-
mony made the statement on page 36, nA deed that was recorded 
July 14th, 1981, to a Rimaras, Inc., who I am told is Mr. Hall 
and Mr. Rigby. I have no actual knowledge that that is a true 
statement." There is no evidence whatsoever outside of this 
atatement of any involvement of Mr. Hall or Mr. Rigby in Rimaras, 
Inc. There is a finding by the Court, that exhibit 2, together 
with exhibit 4 that shows the interest of Rimaras, Inc. was 
never delivered to the purchaser Garland. (See transcript, page 
62, line 3.) Garland at that time was on notice that this 
property belonged to Rimaras, Inc. and did nothing about it. 
There was a Sherifffs sale on the 11th day oi January, 1988, to 
Miss Anna R. Fleischmann, 
ARGUMENTS 
A. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURTS INTERPRET 
TITLE 78-12-12, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
(1953, as amended) TN ACCORDANCE 
WTTH THE WORDING OF TEH STATUTE OR 
SOME OTHER WAY 
There should be very little argument about this. The 
Supreme Court of Utah, and to some degree, the Court )f Appeals 
have followed this doctrine without limitation to the effect 
that adverse possession has to strictly comply with this statute, 
Title 78-12-12, Utah Code Annotated, (1953, as amended.) Prior 
to the case of Home OwnerT s Loan Corp. v. Dudley, 105 Utah 208, 
141 P.2d 160, which was decided in 1943, to the effect that 
adverse possession can only be acquired in accordance with the 
exact provisions of the statute requiring adverse possession to 
be for a continuous period of time during which a claimant is in 
possession, has paid all taxes levied and levied on that particular 
property and there must be indicia of title. At that time rather 
than Title 78-12-12, Utah Code Annotated, (1953, as amended), 
the Court used Title 104-2-12, Utah Code Annotated, (1943, as 
amended.) There is a considerable amount of discussion of 
adverse possession, how it is interpreted and how it is acquired. 
And that the statute must be strictly complied with, with taxes 
being paid and there must be andicia of title. This was a reversal 
of the trial court by the Supreme Court of the State of Utah. In 
all probability, it is a leading case in this particular area. 
This doctrine has been upheld by the Supreme Court of the State of 
Utah many times. In the case oJ Koyal Street Land Company 
v. Reed, 739 P.2d 1104, decided on the 9th day of July, 1987, 
the doctrine was upheld by the Supreme Court of the State of 
Utah. Where there is a long time history, one cannot help but 
wonder what was intended by the authors of the Memorandum Decision 
in the instant case, Garland v. Rigby, et al. and the divided 
decision of the Court of Appeals of Utah on the 1st day of 
September, 1989, where it was rendered with the statement under 
the words, Memorandum Decision, T(Not for Publication)1. Also, 
one must look to the dissenting opinion of the Honorable Russell W. 
Bench, Court of Appeals Judge, where in his opinion, he upheld 
the judgment lien of Miss Fleischmann. 
However, since this Memorandum Decision of the Court of 
Appeals in this Garland v. Rigby, et al. situation, filed the 1st 
day of September, 1989, and the Order Denying Petition for Rehear-
ing, dated and filed the 11th day of October, 1989, the Supreme 
Court of Utah has upheld the doctrine that the statute of 78-12-12, 
Utah Code Annotated (1953, as amended,) must be strictly upheld. 
In the case of Grayson Roper Limited Partnership, et al. v. 
Finlinson, et al., 119 Utah Advance Reports, decided by the 
Honorable George E. Ballif in Millard County, Utah, and appealed 
to the Supreme Court of Utah, and on which the Supreme Court of 
Utah has taken jurisdiction instead of remanding it back to the 
Utah Court of Appeals, as they did the Garland case, and in the 
opinion on the Grayson Roper Limited Partnership, et al. v. 
Finlinson, et al., filed on the 17th day of October, 1989, it 
was stated that there must be strict compliance in relation to 
Title 78-12-12, and it was upheld. Tt was an unanimous decision 
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of the Supreme Court of Utah, with a Court of Appeals Judge sitting 
in as a substitute for Associate Justice Howe. There is a stunning 
declaration of statutory construction very correctly done. On 
page 30 of 119 Utah Advance Reports, there is this statement found 
in the second column, line nineteen, in relation to statutory 
construction as follows: 
land is deemed to have been possessed and 
occupied by a party seeking to establish 
adverse possession. They specify that 
cultivation of crops suffices for possess-
ion or occupation. But that alone is not 
enough to establish a claim of adverse 
possession. Payment of taxes is also 
required. Section 78-12-12 provides: 
fIn no case shall adverse pos-
session be considered established 
under the provisions of any section 
of this code, unless it shall be 
shown that the land has been 
occupied and claimed for the period 
of seven years continuously, and 
that the party, his predessors and 
grantors have paid all taxes which 
have been levied and assessed upon 
such land according to law.! 
Thereafter, there is considerable discussion of what payment of 
taxes means. 
B. IS AN AGREEMENT FOR OTHER LAND SIGNED 
BY INDIVIDUALS FROM OUTSIDE THE CHAIN 
OF TITLE COUPLED WITH POSSESSION ONLY 
OF CAPTIONED LAND AND WITHOUT PAYING 
TAXES FOR SEVEN YEARS SUFFICIENT FOR 
ADVERSE POSSESSION. 
This gets to the point where anyone who wants a piece of 
that is coming up for a judgment sale, if he is in the position 
where the purchaser cannot deny his verbal statement that he 
agreed with a deceased owner or a prior owner where there is 
no contract, saying, "I bought that piece of property when a 
stranger appears at the judgment sale. In the event the Supreme 
Court of Utah sees fit in this Garland v. Rigby, et al. case to 
follow the trial court and the Court of Appeals, this puts in 
jeopardy every title insurance item in the State of Utah that is 
based upon a judgment sale. All a person has to do to take the 
property is to show up and say, "I had a possible deal on this 
property with John who is now not available and not in the chain 
of title, and I want the property." Enforcement of this Court of 
Appeals decision will be in the opinion of the undersigned 
jeopardize a great deal of title insurance in the State of Utah. 
The Supreme Court of the State of Utah has in many, many cases 
culminating in the case- of Grayson Roper Limited Partnership v. 
Finlinson, et al., decided on the 17th day of October, 1989, and 
found at 119 Utah Advance Reports, 29, quickly turned its back 
on this thought. The failure of Garland to pay the 1986 taxes 
entirely does away with everything else that he has done. The 
fact that they were paid by Fleischmannrs representative after 
the suit was commenced for adverse possession does not remedy 
this situation. 
In the Grayson Roper Limited Partnership v. Finlinson 
case, cited above, in October, 1989, the Supreme Court of Utah 
defines the intent of Title 78-12-12, and the requirement that 
the intent be complied with. In addition, to the cases of Home 
OwnerTs Corp. v. Dudley, quoted above and Royal Street Land 
Company v. Reed, quoted above, decided in 1943 and 1987, it 
reiterates the doctrine of strict complaince with that statute. 
It cites Farrer v. Johnson, 2 Utah 2d 189, pages 193 and 194, 
decided June 10, 1954, which is an endorsement of the doctrine, 
and it cites other cases even ahead of the landmark case of Home 
Owner's Corp. v. Dudley, cited above. There are many other cases 
prior to Grayson Roper Limited Partnership v. Finlinson, et al. 
in which the Supreme Court has been consistent in finding the 
meaning of the statute and requiring compliance with the statute. 
The same doctrine should bo applied to the case at bar, Garland 
v. Rigby, et al. 
DATED this + ) clay of t^V/-'/*/'< V\ 1989. 
Respectfuliy submi tted, 
PATRICK II. FENTON 
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant 
Anna H. Fleischmann 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
OOOOO 
M L E D 
0CTJW1989 
ftfk o f * * Court 
Robert G. Garland and Mary Garland, 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
v. 
Floyd J. Rigby, Ray Hall, 
Rimaras, Inc., a Utah corporation, 
and Anna R. Fleischmann, 
Defendants and Appellant. 
ORDER DENYING 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
Case No- 880707-CA 
THIS MATTER having come before the Court upon 
Respondent's Petition for Rehearing, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Petition for Rehearing is 
denied. 
DATED this day of October, 1989 
FOR THE COURT: 
Mary T./Noonan 
Clerk 6t the Court 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the 11th day of October, 1989, a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR 
REHEARING was deposited in the United States mail, 
Patrick H. Fenton 
Attorney for Appellant, Anna Flieschmann 
#154 North Main 
P.O. Box 337 
Cedar City, UT 84720 
Michael W. Park 
Park, Braithwaite & Eves 
Attorneys for Respondents 
110 North Main Street, Suite H 
P.O. Box 765 
Cedar City, UT 84720 
Willard R. Bishop 
Bishop & Ronnow, P.C. 
Attorneys for Defendant, Ray Hall 
36 North 300 West 
P. O. Box 279 
Cedar City, UT 84720 
DATED this 11th day of October, 1989. 
By 
Deputy Clerk 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ooOoo 
F I I P O 
Robert G. Garland and Mary 
Garland, 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
v. 
Floyd J. Rigby, Ray Hall, 
Rimaras, Inc., a Utah 
corporation, and Anna R. 
Fleischmann, 
Defendants and Appellant. 
, SEP1 1^ 39 
MEMORANDUM DECISlBW1 Cou!V of 'VM"JS 
(Not For Publication) 
Case No. 880707-CA 
Sixth District, Garfield County 
The Honorable Don V. Tibbs 
Attorneys: Patrick H. Fenton, Cedar City, for Appellant 
Michael W. Park, Cedar City, for Respondents 
Before Judges Bench, Billings, and Orme. 
BILLINGS, Judge: 
Appellant Anna R. Fleischmann appeals from the trial 
court's order quieting title to a parcel of property referred 
to as lot 128 in respondents, Robert and Mary Garland. We 
affirm. 
Fleischmann does not challenge the trial court's findings 
of fact. Therefore, we review the court's decision under a 
correction-of-error standard according no deference to its 
legal conclusions. See, e.g.. Taubert v. Roberts, 747 P.2d 
1046, 1048 (Utah 1987). Nonetheless, 
[s]ince this is an action at law, upon 
review, the findings and judgment of the 
trial court will be presumed valid, and the 
record will be reviewed in a light favorable 
to them. The appellant is required to 
sustain the burden of proving error, and the 
judgment of the trial court will not be 
disturbed if there be substantial evidence 
in the record to support it. 
Ash v. State, 572 P.2d 1374, 1376 (Utah 1977) (footnote 
omitted) (emphasis added). 
Giving Fleischmann the benefit of the doubt, she claims 
the trial court erred in concluding, 1) the Garlands took the 
property by adverse possession, 2) Rimaras, Inc. had no legal 
interest in lot 128 in July 1985 when Fleischmann filed her 
judgment lien, and 3) Fleischmann did not acquire lot 128 as a 
result of the sheriff's sale. 
We first address Fleischmann's adverse possession claim. 
We agree the trial court's order cannot be sustained under a 
theory of adverse possession. However, adverse possession was 
neither raised, argued, nor relied upon as the basis for the 
trial court's order. Following counsels' closing arguments, 
the trial court asked the Garlands' counsel, "how do you even 
get your basis for your title? You haven't even got it under 
adverse possession." Furthermore, the Garlands at no time 
suggested that they owned the property by virtue of adverse 
possession. Rather, the Garlands relied on, among other 
theories, the doctrine of oral agreement and full performance. 
Fleischmann's second and somewhat confusing claim is that 
no legal conveyance occurred between Rimaras, Inc. and the 
Garlands because a conveyance of title to the Garlands was not 
recorded prior to the date her judgment lien attached to the 
property. However, Utah law is clear—recordation is not a 
prerequisite to a valid conveyance of real estate as between 
the parties to the transaction. See Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-6 
(1986) (repealed by 1988 Utah Laws ch. 155, § 24); Gregerson v. 
Jensen, 669 P.2d 396, 398 (Utah 1983). "[A] conveyance of real 
property is valid and binding between parties, even without 
recordation." Bekins Bar V Ranch v. Beryl Baptist Church, 642 
P.2d 371, 373 (Utah 1982). See also Huntington Citv v. 
Peterson, 30 Utah 2d 408, 518 P.2d 1246, 1247-48 (1974) (title 
passed at date deed was delivered, notwithstanding no 
recordation). 
Moreover, Fleischmann is not entitled to the statutory 
protections accorded subsequent purchasers under Utah Code Ann. 
§ 57-3-3 (1989). It is clear that she had actual notice of the 
Garlands' purported interest: in lot 128 prior to the sheriff's 
sale, thereby precluding Fleischmann from being a "good faith" 
purchaser under the statute. Accordingly, the resolution of 
this dispute is not controlled by the recording statutes. Cf, 
Greaerson, 669 P.2d at 398. 
Utah law is also clear that a judgment lien attaches to 
the nonexempt real property of the debtor, but is "'subordinate 
and inferior to a deed which predate[s] it, whether recorded 
after such judgment or whether not recorded at all.'" Lach v. 
Deseret Bank, 746 P.2d 802, 804 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) (quoting 
Kartchner v. State Tax Comm'n, 4 Utah 2d 382, 294 P.2d 790, 791 
(1956)). We find no relevant distinction between property 
conveyed by deed or property conveyed by other legally valid 
methods. The foregoing rule of law applies with equal force to 
any effective conveyance of real property occurring before the 
date the judgment lien attaches. 
"[I]f the unrecorded conveyance was one 
which was made in good faith and for value, 
the lien would not attach, even though the 
judgment creditor had no knowledge or notice 
of it. By merely docketing his judgment, a 
judgment creditor parts with nothing, and 
does not become entitled to have the 
property of an innocent purchaser for value 
applied in satisfaction of a debt he does 
not owe.M 
Wilson v. Willamette Indus., Inc., 280 Or. 45, 569 P.2d 609, 
611 (1977) (quoting Thompson v. Hendricks, 118 Or. 39, 245 P. 
724, 726-27 (1926)). 
Although the trial court's legal basis for quieting title 
in the Garlands rested on a theory of equity and fairness, 
which, without more, cannot be sustained, in the interest of 
judicial economy, this court "may affirm trial court decisions 
on any proper ground(s), despite the trial court's having 
assigned another reason for its ruling." Buehner Block Co. v. 
UWC Assocs,, 752 P.2d 892, 895 (Utah 1988). See also Mel 
Trimble Real Estate v. Monte Vista Ranch, Inc., 758 P.2d 451, 
456 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
Accordingly, in light of the foregoing, the narrow issue 
presented on appeal is whether the record supports a finding 
that Rimaras, Inc. had no ownership interest in lot 128 on or 
after the date Fleischmann's lien was docketed. 
At trial, the Garlands quiet title action rested in large 
part on a theory of oral agreement and part or full 
performance. Cf.. Baldwin v. Vantage Corp., 676 P.2d 413, 417 
(Utah 1984); Legrand Johnson Corp. v. Peterson, 26 Utah 2d 158, 
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486 P.2d 1040, 1041 (1971). After reviewing the record, 
including Mr. Garland's undisputed testimony, the pleadings, in 
which admissions of fact contained therein are treated as 
conclusive against the party making them, see Baldwin, 676 P.2d 
at 415, and Rimaras, Inc.'s post-trial stipulation, we conclude 
the evidence supports the Garlands' legal theory. 
Mr. Garland testified that the parties entered into an 
oral agreement to purchase lot 128. In reliance, Mr. Garland 
took possession and constructed a cabin on the property. In 
consideration for the property, Mr. Garland gave personal 
property to Hall and Rigby. Mr. Garland's undisputed affidavit 
stated that he paid the purchase price in full pursuant to the 
parties' agreement. 
In his answer to the Garlands' complaint, Floyd Rigby did 
not deny that the Garlands entered into an agreement with 
Rimaras, Inc. to purchase lot 128, and thus his failure to 
respond is deemed an admission. Ray Hall, in his answer, 
affirmatively asserted that he acted on behalf of Rimaras, Inc. 
during all relevant times to this action. Finally, Rimaras, 
Inc.'s post-trial stipulation disclaimed any interest in the 
property as of 1982, and affirmatively asserted that the 
Garlands were the owners of the property and entitled to 
possession as of that same year. Moreover, we treat the 
stipulation as binding between the parties in the absence of a 
legitimate challenge to the validity of the agreement. See 
generally Day v. Steele, 111 Utah 481, 184 P.2d 216, 220 
(1947). Although Fleischmann did challenge the stipulation 
generally, in the proceedings below, the trial court did not 
rule on the challenge nor does Fleischmann renew her challenges 
before this court. 
Accordingly, we find the evidence supports the Garlands' 
theory of oral contract and full performance, and thus, the 
trial court's conclusion that Rimaras, Inc. had no interest in 
the property either at the time the lien was docketed or at the 
time of the sheriff's sale. The order quieting title to lot 
128 in the Garlands is affirmed. 
Judith M. Billings, Judge 
CONCUR 
Orme, Judge 
BENCH, Judge (dissenting): 
I respectfully dissent. 
The majority's affirmance of the trial court's order seems 
to be based on the fact that Rimaras had no legal interest in 
lot 128 when Fleischmann filed her judgment lien. Record title 
clearly shows that Rimaras owned the property on that date. Any 
claim that the Garlands may have had to the disputed property 
derives from actions and promises by Hall and Rigby—not 
Rimaras. There is not even a claim that Hall and Rigby ever 
owned the property or that Rimaras is the alter ego of Hall and 
Rigby. My colleagues' decision suggests that a disclaimer of 
interest by record owner Rimaras can alter title to the 
disadvantage of judgment creditor Fleischmann. I believe that 
is contrary to law. 
I would reverse the "equitable" judgment of the trial court. 
Russell W. Bench, Judge 
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IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
GARFIELD COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT G. GARLAND and 
MARY GARLAND, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
FLOYD J. RIGBY, RAY HALL, 
RIMARAS, INC., a Utah 
Corporation, and ANNA R. 
FLEISCHMANN, 
Defendants. 
The above entitled matter came on regularly for hearing on 
Thursday the 6th day of October, 1988, before the Honorable Don 
V. Tibbs, District Court Judge and the Plaintiffs were present 
and represented by their attorney, Michael W. Park and Anna R. 
Fleischmann was represented by her attorney, Patrick H. Fenton 
and the Court having heard the testimony of the parties and 
having reviewed th^ exhibits and having heard the arguments of 
counsel, now makes its findings of fact and conclusions of law. 
1. The Court finds that the Plaintiff purchased property 
from Floyd Rigby and Ray Hall in the area of Mammoth Creek 
Estates, pursuant to a certain earnest n ^ ney receipt and offer to 
purchase. The Court finds that the P aintiffs were given the 
option to take a different lot in the Tommy Creek Subdivision and 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. 86-431 
Plaintiffs examined the premises and exercised their option to 
purchase lot #128. 
2. The Court finds that the Plaintiffs went into 
possession of lot #128 at Tommy Creek Subdivision in 1981 and 
purchased a cabin kit from Floyd Rigby or Ray Hall and put a 
cabin on lot #128. 
3. The Court finds that the Plaintiffs were in physical 
possession of said cabin on a regular basis until 1986 when 
Plaintiff became ill and could not go to the high altitudes 
because of said illness. 
4. The Court finds that the Plaintiffs received a letter 
from Ray Hall on January 21, 1981, together with a copy of a deed 
and the Defendant, Ray Hall said in his letter that the warranty 
deed would be recorded and that the seller, at that time was Ray 
Hall and Floyd Rigby. 
5. The Court finds that the Plaintiff did not take further 
action until there was notice that a Sheriff's sale would be held 
on the 11th day of January, 1988 and said SheriffTs sale was for 
lot #128, Tommy Creek Subdivision. 
6. The Court finds that the Plaintiff paid taxes on the 
property for the years 1981, 198- 1 '3, 984 and 1985. 
7. The Court finds that the P aintiff paid the taxes for 
the year 1987 and that the attorney for Anna R. Fleischmann paid 
the taxes for the year 1986. 
8. The Court finds that th attorney for Anna R. 
Fleischmann obtained a judgment against Rimaras Inc., and filed 
said judgment of record on the 8th day of July, 1985. 
9. The Court finds that the property was noticed for 
Sheriff's sale on January 11, 1988 and that the attorney for Anna 
R. Fleischmann and the attorney for Plaintiffs attended said sale 
and the attorney for Plaintiffs put Fleischmanns on notice that 
the Plaintiffs claimed that they owned all of lot #128 and the 
cabin situated thereon and Fleischmann was put on notice, through 
her attorney, prior to the time of the SheriffTs sale. 
10. The Court finds that the Sheriff ?s sale took place and 
the Sheriff's deed was issued to Fleischmann on July 12, 1988. 
11. The Court finds that on November 11, 1987, that Floyd 
Rigby wrote to Plaintiffs and told him that he would give Mr. 
Garland a warranty deed from Rimaras, Inc., to Mr. & Mrs. 
Garland, if Mr. Garland would pay certain amounts requested by 
Mr. Rigby as set forth in the letter. The Court finds that Mr. 
Garland refused to pay that amount. 
12. The Court finds that the record title is in the name of 
Mrs. Anna R. Fleischmann, pursuant to a Sheriff Ts deed and that 
possession of the property is in the Plaintiffs. 
13. The Court finds that Rimaras Inc., is in default and 
asserts no ownership interest in said property and that Ray Hall, 
through his attorney, Willard R. Bishop, does not claim an 
ownership interest in said property. 
14. The Court finds that the case of Kartchner v. State Tax 
Commission, 294 P.2d 790, (Utah 1956) is controlling and that 
the Defendant, Anna R. Fleischmann purchased whatever interest 
Rimaras owned in lot #128 at Tommy Creek Subdivision at Shei-ff's 
sale. 
15. The Court finds that Rimaras Inc., did not have any 
ownership interest in the property at the tine the Sheriff's 
sale was made* 
16. The Court finds that to hold otherwise would shock the 
Court and that it would be patently unfair to deliver the real 
property and the cabin to the Defendant Anna R. Fleischmann. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Based on the foregoing findings of fact the Court concludes 
that the Plaintiffs are entitled to judgment quieting title to 
said property in favor of Plaintiffs and against the Defendants 
Anna R. Fleischmann, Rimaras Inc., and Ray Hall. 
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110 N. Main, Suite H 
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Cedar City, UT 84720 
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IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
GARFIELD COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT G. GARLAND and 
MARY GARLAND, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
FLOYD J. RIGBY, RAY HALL, 
RIMARAS, INC., a Utah 
Corporation, and ANNA R. 
FLEISCHMANN, 
Defendants. 
The above entitled matter came on regularly for hearing on 
Thursday the 6th day of October, 1988, before the Honorable Don 
V. Tibbs, District Court Judge and the Plaintiffs were present 
and represented by their attorney, Michael W. Park and Anna R. 
Fleischmann was represented by her attorney, Patrick H. Fento/i 
and the Court having heard the testimony of the parties and 
having reviewed the exhibits and having heard the arguments of 
counsel, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that title r.o th>^  
following described property located in Garfield County, State of 
Utah is hereby quieted in favor of Robert G. Garland and Mary 
Garland and against Rimaras, Inc., a Utah Corporation, Anr. i R. 
Fleischmann and Ray Hall, Said property is located in Gar.ield 
JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 86-431 
County, State of Utah and more particularly described as follows: 
All of Lot 128 MAMMOTH CREEK RANCHETTS, TOMMY CREEK UNIT 1, 
a subdivision, according to the Official Plat thereof, 
recorded in the office of the County Recorder of said 
County. 
Rimaras, Inc., a Utah Corporation, Ray Hall and Anna R. 
Fleischraann have no interest in said_property. 
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78-12-7 JUDICIAL CODE 
find not when cause is created, 3 A. L. E. 
682. 
Limitat ion applicable to action for con-
sequential damage as result of taking or 
damaging of property for public use, 30 
A. L. B. 1190, 139 A. L. R. 1288. 
Limitation applicable to action or pro-
ceeding by owner for compensation where 
property is taken in exercise of eminent 
domain without antecedent condemnation 
proceeding, 123 A. L. R. 676. 
Post ing of notice or other steps pre-
liminary to nonjudicial foreclosure of mort-
His tory: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; 0. 1943, 
Supp., 104-12-7. 
Compiler's Notes. 
This section is identical to former sec-
tion 104-2-7 (Code 1943) which was re-
pealed by Laws 1951, ch. 58, § 3. Section 
104-2-7 was amended by Laws 1951, ch. 19, 
§ 1; tha t provision is compiled as 78-12-
7.1 herein. The Supreme Court held the 
amendment was valid despite the repeal of 
section 104-2-7. 
Cross-Kef erences. 
Marketable record ti t le, 57-9-1 et seq. 
Occupying claimants, 57-6-1 et seq. 
Applicability of section. 
This section does not apply to pr ivate 
r ights of way or to any other class of 
easement by prescription. Harkness v. 
Woodmansee, 7 U. 227, 26 P. 291. 
Admission. 
In action to recover possession of cer-
tain real property, defended on ground of 
adverse possession, defendant 's applica-
• tion to enter lands as homestead, held 
direct admission tha t legal titlo to lands 
was in United States. Hanks v. Lee, 57 
U. 537, 195 P. 302. 
Boundary dispute. 
In an action to quiet title where it was 
proved that fence separating the l i t igants ' 
properties was off center, but had been 
maintained on the same line for 58 years, 
a boundary by acquiescence was created. 
Provonsha v / P i t m a n , 6 II. (2d) 26, 305 
P. 2d 486. 
gage or deed of t rust as suspending s tatute 
of limitations, 122 A. L. R. 938. 
S ta tu te of limitations applicable to ac-
tion for encroachment, 24 A. L. R. 2d 903. 
When does cause of action accrue, for 
purposes of s ta tu te of limitations, against 
action based upon encroachment of build-
ing or other structure upon land of an-
other, 12 A. L. R. 3d 1265. 
When s ta tu te of l imitations or laches 
commences to run against action to set 
aside fraudulent conveyance or t ransfer 
in fraud of creditors, 100 A. L. R. 2d 1094. 
Cotenants. 
Fact that some of tenants in common 
have been in exclusive possession of the 
common property for more than seven 
years is not sufficient to show tha t their 
possession has been adverse to other co-
L
 tenants, since cotenant is entit led to pos-
» session of entire property so long as he 
does not exclude his cotenants or other-
l wise clearly act adversely to their rights, 
and, to acquire t i t le by adverse posses-
sion, cotenant must in some way indicate 
to his cotenants that he is claiming the 
X>roperty adversely to them. Sperry v. 
Tolley, 114 U. 303, 199 P . 2d 542. 
Fact tha t some of tenants in common 
contracted to purchase tax titles to the 
s common property in their own names 
J was insufficient to put other cotenants on 
notice of adverse claims by such tenants 
in common, since other cotenants had right 
to believe that tax titles were being pur-
chased for their benefit and not in oppo-
sition to them. Sperry v. Tolley, 114 U. 
e 303, 199 P. 2d 542. 
Repairs and improvements made by 
1 cotenants in possession to dwellings, build-
ings and fences were insufficient to put 
J other cotenants on notice tha t cotenants 
in possession were claiming title adversely 
to them, since such acts were normally 
consistent with tenancy in common and 
s not adverse to it. Sperry v. Tolley, 114 U. 
i' 303, 199 P. 2d 542. 
ii While "for sale" advertisement as to 
! part of common property by cotenants 
I in possession was sufficient to put other 
cotenants on notice of adverse claim, suf-
ficient time had not elapsed therefrom to 
78-12-7. Adverse possession—Possession presumed in owner.—In every 
action for the recovery of real property, or the possession thereof, the 
person establishing a legal title to the property shall be presumed to have 
been possessed thereof within the time required by law; and the occupation 
of the property by any other person shall be deemed to have been under 
and in subordination to the legal title, unless it appears that the property 
has been held and possessed adversely to such legal title for seven years 
before the commencement of the action. 
184 
LIMITATION OF ACTIONS 78-12-12 
when it was suitable only for placer min-
ing, where smother subsequently and sur-
reptitiously located and filed placer claim 
covering land. Springer v. Southern Pac. 
Co., 07 IT. 590, 248 P. 819. 
Defendants failed to establish occupa-
tion or possession of certain land within 
limits of requirements of this section, 
where only evidence of possession con-
sisted of use by defendants of tha t land 
for grazing of their cattle, which use 
was not exclusive inasmuch as third per-
son used the land for same purpose to 
knowledge of defendants without inter-
vention or complaint on their part . Jenkins 
v. Morgan, 113 U. 534, 196 P. 2d 871. 
Repairs and improvements made~by' co-
tenants in possession to dwellings, build-
ings and fences were insufficient to put 
other eotenants on notice that cotenants 
in possession were claiming title adversely 
to them, since such acts were normally 
consistent with tenancy in common and 
not adverse to it. Sperrv v. Tollev, 114 
U. 303, 199 P. 2d 542. 
Maintenance of a fence, payment of 
taxes, and other evidence of possession 
and occupation for over twenty years 
were sufficient to establish ownership as 
against city's claim. Gibbons v. Salt Lake 
City Corp., 6 U. (2d) 219, 310 P. 2d 513. 
Collateral References. 
Adverse Possession<§=>19-21. 
2 C.J.S. Adverse Possession § 30 et seq. 
3 Am. Jur . 2d i>7 et seq., Adverse ]> 
session § 19 et seq. 
Acquisition by user or prescription of 
right of way over uninclosed land, 46 A. L. 
K. 2d 1140. 
Adverse possession based on encroach-
ment of building or other structure, 2 A. 
L. R. 3d 1005. 
Adverse possession involving ignorance 
or mistake as to boundaries—modern 
views, 80 A. L. R. 2d 1171. 
Adverse possession of common, 9 A. L. R. 
1373. 
Adverse possession of railroad right of 
-way, 50 A. L. R. 303. 
Cutting of timber as adverse possession, 
170 A. L. R. 887. 
Grazing of livestock or gathering of nat-
ural crop as fulfilling traditional elements 
of adverse possession, 48 A. L. R. 3d 818. 
Possession by widow after extinguish-
ment of dower as adverse to heirs or their 
privies, 75 A. L. R. 147. 
Reputation as to ownership or claim as 
admissible on question of adverse posses-
sion, 40 A. L. R, 2d 770. 
Use by public as affecting acquisition by 
individual of right of wav by prescription, 
111 A. L. R, 221. 
Use of property by public as affecting 
acquisition of title bv adverse possession, 
56 A. L. R, 3d 1182. " 
78-12-12. Possession must be continuous, and taxes paid.—In no case 
shall adverse possession be considered established under the provisions of 
any section of this code, unless it shall be shown that the land has been 
occupied and claimed for the period of seven years continuously, and that 
the party, his predecessors and grantors have paid all taxes which have 
been levied and assessed upon such land according to law. 
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943, ship went into actual possession of certain 
lots which had been sold to county for 
unpaid taxes, and immediately thereafter 
fenced lots and commenced to improve 
them, subsequently receiving deed from 
county, held possession wTas adverse, from 
time of entry, as to all the world except 
county. Welner v. Stearns, 40 U. 185, 120 
P. 490, Ann. Cas. 1914C, 1175. 
Open, notorious and hostile use and pos-
session of the property and payment of 
taxes thereon, all under claim of right, 
will constitute adverse possession. Mans-
field v. Neff, 43 U. 258, 134 P . 1100. 
Where defendant and his predecessors 
had been in actual, open, and adverse 
possession of land for s tatutory period, 
and for seven successive years had paid 
taxes thereon, and they were inclosed, 
occupied, and cultivated, t i t le was ac-
Supp., 104-12-12. 
Compiler's Notes. 
This section is identical to former sec-
tion 104-2-12 (Code 1943) which was re-
pealed by Laws 1951, ch. 58, § 3. Section 
104-2-12 was amended by Laws 1951, ch. 
19, § 1 ; tha t provision is compiled as 78-
12-12.1 herein. The Supreme Court held 
the amendment was valid despite the re-
peal of section 104-2-12. 
Cross-Kef erences. 
Marketable record title, 57-9-1 et seq. 
Occupying claimants, 57-6-1 et seq. 
Tax sales, 59-10-29 et seq. 
Acquisition of title in general. 
Where claimant under claim of owner-
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